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1 How to recognise a kick: A cognitive task analysis of drillers' situation awareness during well operations.
Introduction
A fundamental aspect of an offshore oilfield driller's job is the ability to monitor and detect changes in the well state, which could indicate that control of the hazardous hydrocarbons has been compromised, so as to take the best actions to mitigate any adverse consequences.
Should well control be lost (i.e. the downward hydrostatic pressure of the column of drilling fluid is exceeded by the upward formation pressure), an uncontrolled influx of fluids into the wellbore can occur with the potential to escalate into a kick, such as happened on Deepwater Horizon (see Report to the President, 2011; Chemical Safety Board, 2016) . Consequently, kick detection (i.e. the task of detecting changes in well state that indicate a kick could occur) is a safety critical aspect of not only well control, but of the safety of the (approximate 120) crew on board the drilling rig. The ability to remain vigilant for changes in the well state, to recognise and understand the significance of kick indicators for the unfolding situation refers to Situation Awareness (SA). SA is the state of knowing what is going on during task execution and using that understanding to predict how situations may develop (Endsley, 1995) . Research has indicated that drillers require high level SA, particularly during complex tasks such as well control (Roberts, Flin & Cleland, 2015a) .
Given the importance of maintaining well control, drill crew are required to complete mandatory, certified well control courses with examination on both theoretical and practical components including kick detection (IOGP, 2012) . However, despite the importance of SA and other cognitive skills for kick detection, well control courses tend to focus on the technical aspects (e.g. managed pressure drilling; Elmore, Medley & Goodwin, 2014) . It is positive to note that IOGP (2014, a, b) have outlined guidelines for conducting a Crew Resource Management (CRM) training program for well operations which includes SA (e.g. SA skills, symptoms of SA problems and how to combat them) but these require further research.
Coupling the expansion of the drilling industry into increasingly hazardous high-pressure high-temperature and deep water wells, with a demographic shift of large numbers of experiencing drilling personnel retiring (Johnson, Leuchtenberg, Petrie & Cunningham, 2014) , the importance of understanding the SA expertise required for kick detection becomes ever more important for maintaining safety. Cognitive task analysis methods have previously been used in other process industries (e.g. nuclear power plants; Carvalho, dos Santos, Gomes, Borges & Guerlain, 2008) to examine expertise so as to develop interventions that M A N U S C R I P T
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4 support the operator's cognition (e.g. interface design for nuclear power plant control rooms, Kim, Suh, Jang, Hong & Park, 2012) and consequently improve process safety. This paper utilizes the Drillers' SA model (Roberts, Flin & Cleland, 2015a) as the basis for an applied cognitive task analysis to identify the key SA components required for the offshore drillers to complete the safety critical task of kick detection. It illustrates how cognitive task analysis methods can be used to inform interventions that support the operator, such as training, accident analysis, error management and design of the working environment and technology.
Kick detection
Faster recognition of kick indicators is vital for an effective response to reduce the risk of adverse consequences (Fraser, Lindley, Moore & Vander Staak, 2014) . Should a kick be recognised, the driller is required to remotely close the blow out preventer equipment on the sea floor to prevent the highly pressurised hydrocarbons from travelling up to the rig and resulting in a blowout, referred to as shutting in. Similarly should a kick indicator be recognised, the driller is required to assess the integrity of the well by observing whether the flow from the well is stable, referred to as a flow check. Thus, the driller's ability to constantly monitor, recognise and comprehend indicators from the wellbore is vital for kick detection and should a well control situation occur, the best decisions and actions are taken.
Situation awareness
Situation Awareness (SA) is the awareness of what is happening in the work environment, understanding what the information means, and using it to anticipate how situations will develop (Endsley, 1995; . The disastrous consequences that SA failures (e.g. missing indicators) can through poor decision making and unnecessary risk taking have been recognised in process safety (Kaber & Endsley, 1998; Taylor, Wijk, May & Carhart, 2015) (e.g. Deepwater Horizon; Roberts et al., 2015b; Texas City; Khan & Amyotte, 2007;  explosion at the chemical production facility West Virginia Institute, Naderpour, Nazir & Lou, 2015) . A range of SA theories has been proposed (e.g., Smith and Hancock, 1995; Stanton, Salmon, Walker & Jenkins, 2009; Wickens, 2002) . Despite a continuing theoretical debate on SA (e.g. see Dekker, 2015; Endsley, 2015) , Endsley's (1995) three level model of SA currently remains the mostly widely applied in a broad range of high risk domains (e.g. nuclear power plants, Lee, Park, Kim & Seong, 2012; drilling, Sneddon, Mearns & Flin, 
2006). SA is described by Endsley as a cognitive product of three hierarchical levels, perception (Level 1), comprehension (Level 2) and prediction (Level 3), identifying task and environmental factors (e.g. interface design and complexity), as well as individual factors (e.g. goals and experience) that can influence it. SA is supported through operators' tacit mental models of the systems and environment that they work in, allowing them to develop mental pictures of the current situation, as based on their experience/expertise (e.g. see Endsley & Garland, 2000) .
Situation awareness research for kick detection
There is a minimal body of research examining SA in drilling, identifying problems such as failures to monitor or observe data (Sneddon, Mearns & Flin, 2006) , drillers' poor concentration, and difficulties with interpretation of information (Stanton & Wilson, 2001) , as well as with poorly designed aspects of the work environment (Sawaryn, Pickering & Whitely, 2008; Woodcock & Toy, 2011) . The self-report Work Situation Awareness rating tool was employed to examine the impact on stress, sleep disruption and fatigue on SA, as well as the relationship between SA and unsafe behaviour and incident involvement in drilling (Sneddon, Mearns & Flin, 2013) . Interviews with drill crew members and observations of well control scenarios in a high-fidelity simulator were conducted and utilized to develop the Drillers' SA model (Roberts et al., 2015b ) (see Figure 1) , as based upon Endsley's (1995) More recently, the Drillers' SA model has also been used to examine process safety in the drilling industry as an accident analysis framework to examine the drill crew's SA on Deepwater Horizon (Roberts et al., 2015b) . It provided insight into the crew's likely cognitive processes in the lead up to the blowout and why the crew erroneously believed that the well was stable despite indicators to the contrary. Whilst these studies are valuable for examining drillers' cognition, they discuss the general cognitive skills associated with well control, rather than kick detection specifically.
Cognitive task analysis
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) methods can be used to identify the cognitive processes and goal structures that underpin how experts perform complex tasks (Militello & Hutton, 1998) ., such as kick detection This commonly includes conducting a Task Analysis (TA) in which task data (e.g. document analysis) are gathered to document what an operator is required to do to successfully complete a specified task within a system, producing a task description, (e.g. steps and actions; Stanton, 2005) . Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is a popular form of TA as it provides a straightforward method of breaking down a task into increasingly smaller nested tasks to investigate the minute details of task actions, goals and associated decisions (Stanton, 2005) . The method is valuable as the task description and output of HTA's can be used for other activities such as conducting CTA, risk assessment, human error identification and Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA; Stanton, 2004) . CTA is an extension of traditional TA methods, examining cognitive expertise, using techniques including interviews, observations and questionnaires, such as were used to develop the Drillers' SA model. Roberts et al. (2015a) previously used CTA methods to examine drillers' SA; however, their study identified the generic SA skills used while drilling rather than explicitly outlining the precise SA steps for the particular task of kick detection. Similar to HTA, CTA requires significant time and resources. Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) is a streamlined version of CTA, providing the practitioner with a set of data extraction methods that are designed to support interventions, such as training programmes or work design recommendations (see Militello & Hutton, 1998) . This technique was the most relevant for the current study.
Aim
The aim of the study was to identify the SA components required for kick detection by (1) producing a task description from technical information (access to well control manuals, attendance on a training course and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)) and (2) apply the preliminary Drillers' SA model (Figure 1 ) to identify the SA components, using the Applied CTA method (ACTA; Militello & Hutton, 1998) . After completion, this could determine if the Drillers' SA components were present and if there were additional cognitive skills not present in the Drillers' SA model.
Method
The ACTA of SA for kick detection was produced over a seven month period (AprilSeptember 2014) with three SMEs and the process is descibed below in Figure 
Expert feedback
Expert feedback was sought on the technical task description and later on the SA components (see section 3.4.) using a method adapted from Clark, Feldon, van Merrienboer, Yates and Early (2008) and Militello and Hutton (1998) . Three SMEs were contacted through the sponsoring company and a drilling school. All were male with over 25 years' experience in the drilling industry. For practicality, feedback was given face to face from two SMEs and for one via email, with their feedback being used to refine the task description and cognitive steps.
Technical task description
As there are different steps for kick detection depending on the location of the well (e.g. on land or sub-sea well) and the activity (e.g. drilling, tripping or making a connection), the specific task of drilling a sub-sea well was selected as based upon the severe consequences of a kick on a sub-sea well (Ismail et al., 2014) .
As outlined in Figure 2 , three technical well control manuals from the sponsoring company and a well control school were consulted and the first author took part in a five day well control course. Feedback was then sought from three SMEs on the technical task description.
Experts disagree
A disagreement arose between the SMEs regarding what actions should be taken if a change in active pit volume was recognised (whether to take action to flow check or to take alternative actions e.g. check for mud transfer). The disagreement needed to be resolved to complete the CTA. Domain experts frequently disagree, having developed their own methods and mental processes for completing complex tasks, in some cases using different reasoning to solve the same problem (Shanteau, 2001; Weber, Mavin, Roth, Henriqson & Dekker, 2014) . As it was not the researcher's position to comment on technical steps or industry guidelines, advice was sought from a further three SMEs, one of whom was from another drilling company and two were from an operating company, specifically regarding the active Once the technical task description was deemed to be accurate by the SMEs, the SA components in the technical description were identified. The Drillers' SA model (Roberts et al., 2015a) , as well as the prior interview and observation data that the model was developed from, was used as the coding framework to identify the cognitive steps. These prior data consisted of 18 interviews with experienced drill crew and 24 hours of observations (live and in-vivo) of drill crew taking part in well control scenarios in a high fidelity simulator. For example, the coding framework included Drillers' SA components such as attending to the situation, gathering information and recognising cues. The SA components were identified for the full technical task description and given to three SMEs for feedback. The identification of the SA components for the entire task description produced the ACTA account of the cognitive components required for kick detection. 
Further model evaluation
A supplementary aim was to evaluate the Drillers' SA model using Miles, Huberman and Saldana's (2014) guidance on testing the validity of qualitative models. As this was a further evaluation, the criterion was that the cognitive components of the Drillers' SA model should be present in the data. Consequently the Drillers' SA model was evaluated to determine if the key Drillers' SA components were present, if any additional aspects of drillers' SA not included in the model were present or if there were components that did not merit inclusion. Miles et al. (2014) recommend that expert feedback should be obtained to verify the CTA as was done for both the technical and SA steps in the CTA.
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Results
The ACTA account of the SA components required for kick detection was produced as described above and is shown in Figure 3 . It outlines the SA components for the technical steps in the task of identifying and responding to a kick indicator (including the associated decisions and actions.)
Insert Figure 3 approximately here or include a pertinent section for illustration (and make the whole kick detection CTA available as an e-appendix).
___________________________________________________________________________
The ACTA for kick detection and frequency data shown in Table 1 illustrate that to recognise a kick indicator is present utilizes a similar process across all the indicators and action steps, namely recognising a cue from the environment, understanding its significance and anticipating the consequences of the indicator. Perceptual (total frequency = 73) and comprehension components (total frequency = 59) being more frequently identified than anticipation components (total frequency = 43). Meta-cognition had a low frequency count (total frequency = 2) which may be because the task analysis represents the ideal situation whereas meta-cognition was found to be associated with difficult, ambiguous or distracting situations (e.g. Sethumadhavan, 2011 ). However, it should be noted that the frequencies may relate to the weighting of the technical steps outlined in the course and manuals.
The results in Figure 3 and frequency data in Table 1 show that all the Drillers' SA model components were identified, no components were missed out or additional components identified. The ACTA provides a level of consistency with the previous interviews, observations and accident analysis (Roberts et al., 2015a, b) , supporting triangulation and consequently tentatively supporting the prototype Drillers' SA model.
Insert Table 1 approximately here.
The perceptive skills of attending to the situation, such as the drilling parameters on the control screens, gathering information about the well state and surface activity (e.g. making calculations) and recognising relative changes in the drilling parameters (e.g. increase in the percentage of return flow from the well) were vital for the initial stages of kick detection, as reflected in the frequency data (level 1 SA). In some instances, the cues may be present in combination rather than isolation, requiring vigilance for change.
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For changes in the drilling parameters to be understood as kick indicators requires their significance to be interpreted in the context of the driller's mental model (Level 2 SA).
Comprehension that an influx or kick could be in progress occurred in collaboration with the driller's prior understanding of the situation, task specific mental picture, expectations and experiences. The number of times that mental pictures were identified in the ACTA (total frequency = 28) during both the kick indicator (frequency = 17) and action steps (frequency = 7) highlights the importance of accurately maintaining and updating the current on-task mental picture for subsequent cycles of SA, decision making and actions. It is likely that the on-task mental pictures would direct attention and cue recognition, strongly influence interpretation and would be utilized for mental simulation, supporting the functional relationships between the components.
Anticipation of how the situation may develop was vital for accurate decision making and taking the correct actions (e.g. to flow check) in conjunction mental simulations, such as what may be causing the kick indicator (e.g. the well has become underbalanced or a piece of equipment has failed) or mentally preparing a game plan of how to cope with the kick (e.g. using experience and procedures to prepare a plan should the well need to be killed).
Anticipation could also guide subsequent understanding (e.g. estimating how long a mud transfer will impact on the active pit volume would influence comprehension of the situation) and vigilance for indicators (e.g. anticipating that a new formation is coming, may result in a heightened attention for any changes in rate of penetration).
Whilst sharing information and awareness between the driller and drill crew was not mentioned as frequently (total frequency = 8;), this reflects the procedure wherein the driller is instructed that the priority is to flow check or shut in, with calling other crew members as a secondary task. It is likely that sharing information would impact the driller's SA at all levels of SA, impacting on where attention is focused, the way that the situation is interpreted and how it is anticipated to progress.
Discussion
The ACTA account of SA components shown in Figure 3 specifically highlights the importance of SA in kick detection and maintaining well control for process safety (i.e. if a driller misses a kick indicator or fails to understand that an influx is occurring, this can result in a kick or even a blowout). The cognitive account provides valuable insight into how expert M A N U S C R I P T
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offshore drillers develop and maintain SA during kick detection by (1) explicitly outlining the critical SA requirements for kick identification and the subsequent actions of flow check and/or shutting in the well, building upon the general skills identified by Roberts et al.'s prior interview and observation study. It also provides indications of the weighting of these components for kick detection (e.g. the significant importance of cue detection and developing an accurate mental picture of the well state). (2) It tentatively supports the preliminary Drillers' SA model (Roberts et al., 2015a) and consequently supports the fit of Endsley's (1995) The analysis reflects the findings of Sneddon et al.'s (2006) drilling accident analysis with perceptive skills frequently identified in the kick detection task, echoing the misperception errors they identified. The account also identified specific perceptual skills including monitoring, information gathering, vigilance and cue recognition that may have been involved in the analysed drilling accidents. In addition, the ACTA identified mental pictures and comprehension as important SA components for kick detection, reflecting the level 2 SA errors discussed by Sneddon et al. (2006) and Stanton and Wilson (2001) , such as the use of poor or incorrect mental models. Previous research aiming to support drillers' SA through work design (e.g. Woodcock & Toy, 2011; Sawaryn et al., 2008) can be reinforced using the ACTA findings by identifying specific areas that can support drillers' SA (e.g. assisting cue recognition and supporting interpretation of cues; see below recommendations). The SA components in the account mirror those identified in other high-risk, high reliability domains, e.g. nuclear power control operators (Patrick, James, Ahmed & Halliday, 2006) , aviation (Lini, Vallespir, Hourlier, Labat & Favier, 2013) and surgery (Wauben et al., 2011) .
The ACTA provisionally suggests that Endsley's (1995) (Endsley & Jones, 2011; Salas, Prince, Baker & Shrestha, 1995) , as well as the more recent socio-technical theory of distributed situation awareness (Stanton et al., 2009; ) . Given that there is a continuing debate over the concept of SA (see special issues of Cognition Technology & Work (2015) and Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making (2015) ) and whether SA models (e.g. Endsley's three level model) can be deductively validated (i.e. falsified), future research that experimentally tests the model would be valuable.
Limitations and future research
CTA methods are valuable for eliciting explicit and implicit knowledge from experts that can guide user-centred training programmes and work design recommendations (Jones, 2015; Militello & Hutton, 1998) . However, conducting a CTA is time consuming and can be prone to researcher bias which has the potential to skew the data analysis (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2010). As it was not possible to have a second researcher complete the training, only one researcher produced the task description and coded the technical knowledge (e.g. training course and manuals), raising the issue of researcher bias. To address this issue, the researcher attempted to take an open-minded approach to the coding of the kick detection task, considering how potential expectations and biases may influence the analysis. As the SMEs had no prior knowledge of the SA models, they provided relatively objective feedback on the ACTA account. It should be noted that a study's objectives will determine the most appropriate TA methods to use, which can result in different outcomes. Further studies examining driller expertise may benefit from using and comparing multiple TA methods depending on study's intended deliverables.
The ACTA tentatively confirms Roberts et al.'s (2015b) Drillers' SA model and supports the fundamental information processing steps of recognising key indicators, interpreting that information and projecting of how the situation may develop, as outlined in Endsley's model. However, further testing will be required to examine the underlying components and linearity of the model. For example, sequential analysis could be used to test the sequence of the cognitive components (e.g. a sequential analysis; Cohen-Hatton, Butler & Honey, 2015) .
A quantitative performance measure of driller SA which is less prone to research bias is an online simulated monitoring task that is being developed on the basis of the ACTA. It will have the potential to train and formatively assess drillers' cognitive skills (Roberts, Flin & Cleland, in prep) . Drillers monitor well control scenarios on a computer with cue recognition, M A N U S C R I P T
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14 comprehension and decision making data being used as performance measures. A limitation of the SA kick detection account was that the influencing factors on SA were not examined; however the performance measure could be utilized to investigate factors such as expectations, distractions or work design, on aspects of SA. If successful, the tool could also been used to evaluate changes in drilling processes and drill cabin computer systems design.
The ACTA results could also be used as the basis of a hazard analysis to further examine human performance in relation to the safety critical task of well control, such as has been done using the petroleum Human Reliability Analysis tool (PetroHRA; Van De Merwe, Hogenboom, Rasmussen, Laumann & Gould, 2014) . Further of the influencing factors and their impact on subsequent decision making and actions would be beneficial (e.g. how drilling software layout impacts on kick indicator recognition).
Recommendations
The findings extend existing knowledge on the SA components required for kick detection outlined by Roberts et al. (2015b) which can be used to form the basis of interventions such as effective training and work design recommendations that support the operator and consequently improve safety.
Accident Investigation
Despite research indicating the significant role that human factors play, in drilling and well intervention incidents (e.g. Roberts et al., 2015a; Sneddon et al., 2006; Smith, Kincannon, Lehnert, Wang & Larrañaga, 2013) as well as more broadly within the process industries (e.g. Antonovsky, Pollock & Straker, 2014; Broadribb, 2012; Cox, Carpenter & Ogle, 2014) , there does not appear to be a standard tool for investigating these factors in drilling. The outcome of the ACTA could be used to support accident investigation as a method of understanding why operators missed kick indicators or took certain decisions, rather than blaming them for their actions (Dekker, 2015) . For example, the Drillers' SA model has been used to provide insight into why the drill crew erroneously believed that the well was stable on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig (Roberts et al., 2015a) . The detailed analysis could be used to augment an existing well control investigation system (e.g. Manuele, 2014) 
Situation Awareness Training
A number of simulation centres in the drilling industry already conduct training that includes technical, social and cognitive skills with debriefing on these aspects of performance.
However, given the importance of maintaining kick detection for process safety, the detailed ACTA could be used to inform the training of specific SA scenario training for well control, as has been done in other (e.g. police fire arms training simulator, Saus et al., 2006) . 
Drill Cabin & Software Design
The ACTA results can also be used to inform work design that supports drillers' SA, particularly for kick detection, advancing previous work design research (e.g. Woodcock & Toy, 2011) . With the increase in automation in drilling systems, there is the opportunity to design software systems that support SA, rather than resulting in the performance problem of operators being out of the loop (Endsley & Kiris, 1995) . For example, the drilling system display screens could be designed to support easy recognition of indicators, as emphasised in the ACTA (e.g. when a parameter goes above or below a threshold, the relevant section of the M A N U S C R I P T
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16 trend line could flash). The ergonomic layout of the information on the screens could be arranged to assist information gathering and support the best or ideal mental model (e.g. displaying readings on a 3D visual representation of the well that could be easily navigated).
During flow checking and/or shutting in, the software could inform other crew members that the actions are taking place, rather than the driller having to make a phone call as outlined in the ACTA (e.g. either a message button or programming it to recognise a sequence of actions and automatically sending a message). It would certainly be advantageous that before any new software is installed, it is tested to examine its impact on the drillers' SA as is done in other high risk domains (e.g. nuclear power plant control rooms, Yang, Yang, Cheng, Jou & Chiou, 2012 ; maritime ship navigation, Sauer et al., 2002) .
Conclusion
The ACTA specifically outlines the key SA components required during the safety critical -If no other kick indicator recognised: -Interpret that a kick is not in progress -Update current mental picture that gas has entered the well bore but experience says that it is unlikely to reduce the bottom hole pressure substantially -Anticipate that gas will expand as it is circulated up the well bore which may result in belching.
-Remain vigilant for any further changes with the expectation that drilled gas should only be present for the time taken to circulate out the cuttings if drilled gas. 1.4.1.2. Ensure de-gassing occurs to prevent re-circulation (Action) -Gather information on the current % of gas in the returning mud (Action) 1.4.1.2.1. Ensure that degassers can cope with the level of gas returning -Anticipate whether current amount/% of gas will be removed by degassers by comparing current % of gas in returning mud and working limit of the degasser.
-If unsure (meta-cognition) of working limit, gather information from crew members (Action) 1.4.1.2.2.
If not, circulate until the level of gas becomes acceptable (Decision & Action) -If % of gas in returning mud exceeds working limit of the degasser, take action to circulating rates until level acceptable -Monitor % of gas in mud during circulation and remain vigilant for anticipated acceptable level of gas in mud.
1.4.1.2.3.
Check whether the level of returning gas is caused by too fast a drilling rate -Anticipate that drilling too fast could be causing the gas cut mud -Attend to drilling rate on drilling screen and gather additional information on pre-determined rate -Experience will also inform whether drilling rate is too fast for current task but if unsure seek assistance from Tool Pusher (meta-cognition & sharing information) -Determine if rate is too fast (understanding) 1.4.1.2.3.1. If so, then drill at a controlled rate (so that the gas doesn't break out belching) (Action) -Monitor % of gas for anticipated decrease after drilling rate reduced. 2. The Driller Situation Awareness model, developed from interviews and observations, was utilized to identify the cognitive steps in the ACTA, and was found to be a suitable fit for the drilling domain.
3. The cognitive components required to successfully detect and respond to a kick were explicitly identified: vigilance, recognising and interpreting the cue as a kick indicator in conjunction with a dynamic mental picture down-hole and surface activities, as well as anticipating that this may escalate into a kick or even a blowout.
4. The ACTA account highlights the importance of SA for kick detection and maintaining well control. The findings can be used to inform training and work design recommendations that support driller SA and consequently, supporting process safety in drilling operations.
